

SOCIAL SCIENCES ✓

NATIONAL REVIEW

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A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

Liberation: What Next?

JAMES BURNHAM

*The Middle Way:
A Political Meditation*

RICHARD M. WEAVER

Who Will Liberate Us?

EUGENE LYONS

Articles and Reviews by JOHN CHAMBERLAIN
L. BRENT BOZELL • PETER BAUER • RUSSELL KIRK
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— For the Record —

France is reliably reported to have promised to support Israeli demands for a settlement of the Suez crisis. They are: free navigation for Israeli ships on the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba, internationalization of the Gaza strip, and demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula The first United Nations soldiers to go into the Middle East were insured for \$25,000 each against loss of life, limb or eye The 185 U.S. foreign aid experts withdrawn from the Middle East at the outbreak of hostilities will be back on the job in the next week or two.

U.S. support of the Nationalist China regime was further emphasized last week by the announcement that the Air Force would build a \$25 million jet fighter and bomber base on Formosa. That will put our biggest bombers within 1,700 miles of Peiping NATO plans to build 25 advance airbases in West Germany, with Bonn paying two-thirds of the total cost of \$375 million In the first popularity poll of the new year—an election in West Germany—81-year-old Chancellor Konrad Adenauer still led all his rivals by far, and placed well ahead of his own party.

Twenty-one Southern cities in Arkansas, North Carolina, Virginia, Texas and Tennessee have integrated their buses without violence Representative Adam Clayton Powell says he will reintroduce his bill to bar federal aid to non-integrated schools in this session of Congress The NAACP reports that, for the first time, in 1956 its income topped the one million dollar mark, its membership rising to 350,000.

Brooklyn College last week placed Dr. Harry Slochower back on the payroll, prepared to turn over to him \$40,000 in back pay and immediately announced that he would be suspended. Slochower won reinstatement after the Supreme Court ruled he had been illegally dismissed in 1952 for refusing to testify concerning Communist Party membership In Washington, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld (3 to 0) the right of congressional committees to inquire into the political beliefs and associations of witnesses in "the exercise of legislative duties" and confirmed contempt convictions of Henry Sacher and former Vassar instructor Lloyd Barneblatt.

Candidates of the United Peasant and Democrat parties in Poland have won a place on the ballot for the first time this year and are expected to cut a deep swath into the Communist hold on parliament in the elections of January 20 Poland has released another Roman Catholic Bishop and admitted that the evidence on which he was convicted of espionage had been forged The present Soviet-style uniform worn by Polish troops will be discarded in the near future.

Italian Socialist Pietro Nenni has carried out his threat and returned his Stalin peace medal to Moscow. The cash award which accompanied it, he turned over to charity Comparison of election figures in Communist-dominated factories in industrial Lombardy, in Northern Italy, shows that the Communist vote was 10 to 15 per cent less than a year ago—a smaller decrease than had been expected The Danish government brusquely cancelled plans for a visit to Copenhagen of a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Egypt is emerging as one of the major economic victims of the Suez crisis. Foreign holdings in Egypt are down 65 per cent from midsummer and unemployment is on the increase as the oil shortage pinches the Egyptian economy. Winter tourist resorts are all but deserted U.S. and other Western oil companies are going slow on Middle East expansion plans in view of transportation difficulties, political unrest and the possibility of expropriations Israel, with French help, now plans to build a pipeline from Elath, at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, to the Mediterranean.

French tax collectors, impeded in their rounds by barricades and road blocks put up by Poujadists, got an assist from the government. Authorities announced that any Poujadist caught interfering with traffic would have his driving license automatically revoked.

NATIONAL REVIEW

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The WEEK

● We join with those who hope that Senator Knowland will not retire from public life in 1958. We go further: we hope he has political ambitions of the highest kind, and that he will pursue those ambitions, the realization of which would, in our judgment, be a stimulus to freedom.

● It's a comfort to learn that even the State Department draws the line somewhere. Last week the Kadar gang of servile assassins that calls itself the government of Hungary had the grotesque effrontery to announce its "willingness" to accept Western aid provided it is offered "without political conditions." Mr. Lincoln White, the Department's chief press officer, declared with unusual grammatical simplicity: "We will not assist the present regime in Hungary." Let us hope he will not be overruled by you-know-who.

● Prime Minister Nehru has informed the world, at the 62nd annual conference of the Indian National Congress Party, that Indian socialism will be brought about "through peaceful, democratic means." He adds that in India, with its 370 million people, it will take "ten or twenty years" to persuade everybody to "march to socialism together." In the land of the rope trick all things may be possible. But what interests us here is not Mr. Nehru's assurance that the "persuasion" of millions—*sans* brainwashing?—can be achieved in as short a span as ten or twenty years, but his bland statement that the goal of the ruling Indian party is socialism. This would seem to put Point Four aid to India in a curious light: here we have been endeavoring to impart knowledge to Indians about voluntary methods of expanding production only to be informed that what is learned today must be thrown away tomorrow. If Americans still insist on playing Sisyphus in India they can't say that Nehru hasn't forewarned them.

● The United Steel Workers of America are currently demonstrating the complexities of modern life. At the union's recent convention, the delegates—hand-picked by the reigning bureaucracy according to the usages of trade-union democracy—voted to raise dues from \$3 to \$5 a month, and to boost the salaries of union officials by about 40 per cent. Indignation at the dues hoist and at general bureaucratic insolence has mounted into a sizeable revolt. Ninety-one locals have endorsed a candidate to oppose Mr. McDonald in the union election scheduled for February 11, a rare act of impudence in the world of industrial democracy. Unfortunately, but inevitably,

the Communists have jumped into the opening, and by their support of the opposition have given it the kiss of death. Mr. McDonald will not only be re-elected, but will be able to shrug off the genuine rank and file criticism as Communist-tainted.

● In an attempt to break the long deadlock over Kashmir, Pakistan is expected to ask that a UN force replace its troops now occupying a small corner of that disputed region. Whatever one thinks of UN "forces," such an act would explode the nominal argument on the basis of which Indian soldiers hold most of Kashmir, and would be the preface to a renewed Pakistan demand for a free, UN-supervised election to determine whether the predominantly Moslem Kashmiri prefer to be part of Pakistan or of India. The UN has officially called for such a plebiscite since 1948, but has gone unheeded by Jawarharlal Nehru, preceptor to mankind, who prefers to settle the issue by superior Indian armed force.

● The report of the Tennessee Valley Authority for Fiscal 1956, just released, shows in dramatic fashion how a governmental cancer tends to grow and spread through the tissues of society. By the original legislation, TVA was set up to rehabilitate and develop the valley of the Tennessee River, and was authorized to generate electricity from available water power resulting as a by-product. But the statists, taking clever and unpublicized advantage of the Korean war and the needs of atomic production, are transforming TVA into an unalloyed socialist monstrosity. Today 72 per cent of TVA's electrical output is from steam plants (as against 10 per cent only six years ago), and TVA has become the nation's largest user of coal.

● The dissatisfaction of Okinawans with American military rule has brought about the election of a leftist mayor in their capital, and U.S. authorities are hectically trying to dispose of the major ostensible cause of that discontent—insufficient compensation for land sequestered for the use of American military installations. There is evidence that the unpleasant fact is that Okinawan agitation stems not from economic, but political resentment. Okinawa threatens to take the road of Iceland and Ceylon.

● An Oxford don writes us that there is considerable resentment in England over the parliamentary manners of those who opposed Eden's move into Suez. "People think that the opposition have handled things very badly by their display of temper and lack of control in the House of Commons . . . the younger people have been [especially] shocked. They have never seen in their lifetime a real angry opposition. . . . What I did think was rather ugly was that while the crisis was at its height the opposition was

violent and would sometimes scarcely let the Government leaders speak; when it came to hearing about the gold losses and the threat to the pound it is recorded that there was silence and a very quiet debate. I suppose one should not be surprised by a display of economic determinism by Socialists, but they would have done better to show gravity when they were protesting at what they called violation of international obligations and wanton acts of war. They should not have had to wait for the pound to be in question to sober up."

● A contributing editor of NATIONAL REVIEW writes us of a recent encounter with "a normally suave familiar of the Ford Foundation who wanted to know whether I was the man whose name he had seen in 'a dastardly attempt in NATIONAL REVIEW to stab democracy in the back.' He quite lost his temper when I assured him of the truth. I was told that the man was thus exercised because he had just discovered a copy of NATIONAL REVIEW in the possession of a girl in his own office! Her fate was not disclosed." If the Ford Foundation keeps her on, perhaps, in the pattern of the grant to Plymouth Meeting Library for refusing to fire an employee who pleaded the Fifth Amendment, the Fund for the Republic will grant the Ford Foundation a Reward for extraordinary courage!

Why Not Start from Scratch?

Mr. Bozell's able analysis (see p. 56) of President Eisenhower's message to Congress on the Mideast focuses attention on two points that had, at the time he wrote, mysteriously escaped public attention. The first is the President's incredible commitment to use United States troops only within the "framework of the United Nations," and "subject to the Security Council." One must suppose, as Mr. Bozell suggests, that this obeisance to the United Nations in a message asking Congress to suspend its authority was nothing more than a rhetorical embellishment—in context, a grotesque one. Congressional interrogators should, however, get satisfaction on this point during the hearings.

A second point is that the President could have accomplished everything he seeks to accomplish, and on orthodox constitutional grounds, had he merely asked Congress to adopt an appropriate resolution on its own sentiments regarding the Mideast. At this writing Mr. Sam Rayburn has announced that he will sponsor such a declaration in place of the one the President seeks. Mr. Rayburn's resolution reads: "The United States regards as vital to her interest the preservation of the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East and if necessary will use her armed force to that end."

NATIONAL REVIEW endorses Mr. Rayburn's substitute.

Finally, we revert to the central weakness of Mr. Eisenhower's program: what are we to do to frustrate Soviet colonization of the Mideast if, as is to be expected, it is to be attempted in the characteristic Soviet mode? Specifically, what are we to do if—as now threatens in Syria—the Communists succeed in satellizing a nation by internal action?

Evidently we will do nothing. Mr. Dulles now assures the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that U.S. forces would be sent into action in the Middle East only against armed aggression, and never to topple a Red government set up by subversion. ("We won't walk in to overthrow any government that was installed in that area . . . *however it gets there,*" he said.)

If that is so, the Eisenhower Doctrine is strategically meaningless, for it is inconceivable that the Soviet Union should ever advance upon the Middle East by force of arms.

Congress is faced with the difficulty of walking a delicate tightrope. We must do everything in our power to arrest Soviet attempts at internal colonization, and yet we must not appear to be interfering in domestic problems.

The position the government should take might be stated more or less as follows: "History establishes that there is no such thing as a popular Communist government. Communism has its way in nations and among nations by the use of force, trickery, and deceit. It follows that any Communist government that comes to power in any nation in the Mideast is athwart the interests of the people of that nation, and will not be recognized by the United States as legitimate."

Behind the Filibuster Vote

By a vote of 55 to 38, the Senate has voted to table (and thereby kill) a tricky attempt of the Liberal bloc to open up the Senate rules for what could have been general revision. The aim of the Liberals was to grease the procedures for passing, and imposing on the states affected—the Southern states, that is—extreme measures of racial integration. It was natural, therefore, that the Southern Senators, to defend their states against despotic centralism and to represent faithfully the settled views of their constituents, should have voted against the rules revision. But it would be an error to see in this parliamentary dispute only a conflict of views on the racial question.

Senator Knowland and Senator Theodore Green are anti-segregationists—no less so, in all probability, than Senators Hubert Humphrey and Clifford Case. But Senators Knowland and Green voted for the



Hungarian Czardas

motion to table. The reason is that they, and many others in the majority, were acting in terms not of an immediate and inevitably passing (however important) problem, but of an underlying conception of the nature of our government, our Constitution and our political tradition.

The Liberal bloc held solid. Many of its members are indifferent to the constitutional and procedural issues. They are ready to bend these to their political ends of the moment. In January 1957 they take the parliamentary position that the Senate is *not* "a continuing body," because this is the most expedient way to get their will on integration. In November 1954 they took the opposite position, because otherwise their aim of censuring Senator McCarthy would have been out of order (his alleged offenses having been committed during the preceding Congress).

Some of the Liberals, indeed, do construct their views on a theoretical base, and this led them equally to their January 4 vote. They believe in a *plebiscitary* notion of democracy, according to which a majority has the unrestricted right to do anything whatsoever about any subject and, therefore, to ride ahead over an "obstructing" minority. A Senate rule that on occasion protects minorities even against the will of the majority is irreconcilable with the plebiscitary point of view.

Our republican system of government, representative and indirect, with its balanced and counterbalancing institutions, were not intended to be a form

of plebiscitary democracy. The Senate majority once more upheld the basic tradition of American government, and again proved that Congress is the final fortress of republican liberty.

Senator Bricker Tries Again

With Catonian persistence, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio has once more offered Congress a new amendment designed to bring the treaty-making power strictly within the constitutional framework of our government. The wording has been clarified, and somewhat extended, in order to make sure that the legitimate treaty function on the one hand would not be hampered but, on the other, could not be used as a substitute for the domestic law-making process.

The new text reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement not made in pursuance of this Constitution shall have no force or effect. This section shall not apply to treaties made prior to the effective date of this Constitution.

"Sec. 2. A treaty or other international agreement shall have legislative effect within the United States as a law thereof only through legislation, except to the extent that the Senate shall provide affirmatively, in its resolution advising and consenting to a treaty, that a treaty shall have legislative effect.

"Sec. 3. An international agreement other than a treaty shall have legislative effect within the United States as a law thereof only through legislation valid in the absence of such an international agreement.

"Sec. 4. On the question of advising and consenting to a treaty, the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the Senators voting for and against shall be entered on the journal of the Senate."

Strong public support for Senator Bricker's campaign, even if congressional action fails once more during this session, will of itself act as a brake on any tendency to abuse the treaty-making power.

Taking a Chance on Themselves

The strike scheduled by Local 761 of the International Union of Electrical Engineers to begin January 7 at the General Electric plant in Louisville, Kentucky, has been called off.

Last fall, a member of Local 761 complained that a man with less seniority than he had been promoted ahead of him. By the time his case had traveled up union-management channels, the issue was joined: the union insisted that all promotions be based exclusively upon seniority; General Electric upheld the intrinsic right of management to promote em-

ployees according to their demonstrated ability. In compliance with exhortations by the union, the rank and file of Local 761 voted to strike.

Convinced that the issue had not been adequately presented to its employees, General Electric undertook to set the facts before them. Management representatives asked whether they actually preferred to have a false equality imposed upon them, or whether they were willing to take their chances on their skill and industry.

On a snowy night last week, a few hours before the deadline, six thousand men turned up at a union meeting in Louisville and decided—unanimously—that they would not strike. In a desperate attempt to salvage their prestige, union officials announced to the press that, after all, General Electric has no monopoly on "community interest, welfare, or responsibility." So far as six thousand individual members of the union are concerned, the officials of Local 761 spoke the truth.

Mr. Whitney Goes to London

If ancestry can make a diplomat, John Hay—or Jock—Whitney should do well as Eisenhower's newly designated Ambassador to the Court of St. James's. Jock's maternal grandfather, John Hay, was Teddy Roosevelt's Secretary of State; his paternal grandfather, William C. Whitney, made millions in street railways. Thus Jock has both a tradition of diplomacy in the family and the inherited means to meet the considerable excess above salary and allowances which is demanded by life at the Court of St. James's.

As to Mr. Whitney's own personal endowments, he has proved himself an able scion of the paternal grandfather. In handling his fortune, Mr. Whitney has followed a tripartite formula: a third for safety, a third for charity, and a third for venture. Under the venture heading comes his backing of such fabulously successful stage and moving picture hits as *Life With Father* and *Gone With the Wind*; also his J. H. Whitney and Co. which has doubled its worth in ten years by grubstaking likely enterprises in such things as frozen orange juice and New Mexico uranium.

If Jock Whitney were engaged in a business venture abroad, we would back him with utmost confidence. But shrewd though he is as Grandfather Whitney's sprig, he has yet to prove himself a worthy descendant of Grandfather Hay. To quote the *New York Times*, Jock Whitney will go to England (the Senate willing) as "one of the best-rounded and versatile representatives of the modern American business world." But, alas, the modern American business world characteristically exhibits a very small understanding of what makes a free system tick.

It is significant that Mr. Whitney, a prototype of the "modern American businessman," a man besides of good heart and good cheer, and generous instincts, is not responsible, so far as we know, for sponsoring the dissemination of a single book, the labors of a single scholar, the dissemination of a single periodical concerned with the undermining of the economic and political tradition under which he and his kind have prospered. Mr. Whitney is a hearty consumer of the benefits of his system, but less concerned than he might fruitfully be with the theoretical dimensions of that system, or the social tendencies that hack away at it. Can he, under the circumstances, do for our society in England all that one might hope an American ambassador would do?

How Much Is It Worth?

The Montgomery, Alabama, bus case has entered into a new phase. The Negroes have ended their boycott, under the umbrella of a federal court order enjoining the municipally licensed bus line to end segregated seating. Now violence has broken out, and it is not possible to say what will be the result of legally coerced integration.

It seems to us that the white residents of Montgomery gave away their case last winter when they refused to license buses to be operated by Negroes for Negroes. It is one thing to take the position that the government has not the power to compel integration; it is another to take the position that Negroes should be made to support a legally constructed monopoly.

How much does segregated bus-riding mean to the white citizens? If it is a matter of principle to them that they ride in separate sections from Negroes, let them prove their devotion to principle by shouldering the cost of private, all-white buses, and allow Negroes to run their own buses. If it is a matter of social preference, let them decide whether that preference is worth the cost of indulging it. As a plain matter of pride, Southerners should be horrified at the thought of asking a racial minority—or, worse, majority—to finance their privileges.

Trials of the Rev. Mr. Powell

The strangest things are happening to Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., agitator extraordinary from Harlem, self-designated champion of the downtrodden, and spiritual counselor to thousands. Mr. Powell has lately been subjected to some uncouth questions, and for a man who enjoys the serenity of three houses, two sports cars, an annual trip to the Salzburg Music Festival, the largest single parish in

the world, and a marriage to Hazel Scott, such things are unsettling.

The interrogation grows out of the extraordinary propensity of Mr. Powell's immediate associates for getting into financial difficulties of the kind that are against the law. Three members of his staff were recently indicted for income-tax evasion, and two of them have been convicted. A fourth member, who served as treasurer of Mr. Powell's Abyssinian Church Federal Credit Union, is charged with embezzling several thousands of dollars. And divers witnesses have said unpleasant things, such as that Mr. Powell received kickbacks from a member of his congressional staff who, moreover, was not able to recall a single duty that she performed while on the payroll of the government.

Well, things will die down again soon, in time for Salzburg in the summer, let us hope. The Reverend Mr. Powell is a philosophical man, and he knows that life is a vale of tears.

Open Letter to Alfred Knopf

Dear Mr. Knopf:

In a few weeks you will publish a book by Alger Hiss. You are publishing it, you say, because it is your duty as a publisher to furnish a forum for the ventilation of views however unpopular, or different from your own.

It is by no means clear that publishing Alger Hiss is a gesture in behalf of free speech; for Alger Hiss affects not to have been guilty, as charged and as proven. If he were to admit that he was guilty of perjury, that he had conspired against our government, and had written a book stating why he has chosen Communism, then perhaps your instinct, as a publisher, to present him with the means for putting forward his point of view might understandably have been aroused. But as long as Mr. Hiss continues in his masquerade, those who assist him—in whatever way—become servants of demonstrated untruth, and accomplices, besides, in the smear of the faithful and conscientious men and women whose efforts brought Alger Hiss to justice.

But you have resolved to bring out the book anyway. May we suggest an opposite gesture? You specifically dissociate yourself and your firm from Hiss, or a belief in his innocence. Why not demonstrate your faith in reason and the processes of American justice by donating all the profits derived from publishing Hiss' book to the purchase of copies of *Witness* for distribution to libraries throughout the world? Such a motion on your part would, it seems to us, help to clarify your position.

Yours sincerely,
The editors of NATIONAL REVIEW

The Mideastern Policy

L. BRENT BOZELL

President Eisenhower's address to Congress on the Middle East situation was, in some respects, pleasing to the ears of his rightist critics on Capitol Hill. For one thing, it was an anti-Communist speech: its appraisal of the nature of the Soviet threat and of Soviet intentions was sterner and more accurate than any from the President's lips since the State of the Union Message of 1953.

On its face, at least, the speech broke completely with the Spirit of Geneva. Moreover, on the root question separating the Administration and its right-wing critics—a question involving momentous judgments of both fact and value—the President appeared to yield: he allotted his emphases in such portions as to convey a net impression that the country has greater reason to fear Communism than to fear war.

For another thing, Mr. Eisenhower's address was as forthright a confession of foreign policy bankruptcy as could ever be expected from a chief-of-state. A failure in the Middle East—that specifically; but also a failure in the nation's underlying approach to the Soviet challenge.

As regards the Middle East, one had only to close one's eyes while the President spoke over television, and superimpose the appropriate accent and—why, it is Mr. Eden or M. Mollet! pleading earnestly and cogently during the Suez crisis for resolute action by the West. The analyses, the arguments, the forebodings were on loan from Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay. As, indeed, was the essential remedy from which, at an earlier date, the Eisenhower Administration shrank away.

There is, observed Mr. Eisenhower, "a high degree of instability in much of the Mideast . . . [which] has been heightened and at times manipulated by international Communism." "Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East . . . [and today that area is] prized more than ever by [the Soviet Union] . . . considering

her announced purpose of communizing the world."

But we cannot permit the Soviets to dominate the Middle East, the President continued, since the Suez Canal is "essential" to Western Europe, and since the Middle East "contains about two-thirds of the presently known oil deposits of the world" upon which "the nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent." If the Middle East "were dominated by alien forces hostile to freedom, that would be a tragedy for the area and for many other free nations whose economic life would be subject to near strangulation. Western Europe would be endangered just as though there had been no Marshall Plan, no North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

What to do? "Words alone"—i.e., "moral suasion," the principal weapon of past U.S. policy in the Middle East—Mr. Eisenhower conceded, "are not enough." Nor (save the mark!) is the United Nations: the UN "cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom where the ambitions of the Soviet Union are involved." What America must do, the President was saying, is prevent a power vacuum in the Middle East which the Communists can and will fill, i.e., *preserve the Middle East as a Western sphere of influence and power.*

The tragedy of Mr. Eisenhower's *volte face* on—let's face it—"colonialism" was apparent from the kind of measures with which he proposed to buttress it: U.S. money and matériel to be made available to nations that may or may not want it, and that, if they do want it, may or may not use it to thwart Soviet machinations and intrigue—plus a tentative pledge to defend the area against a Russian military invasion that was probably never in the cards anyway. The tragedy is that the last realistic opportunity for preserving the Middle East as a Western sphere faded out when British and French troops withdrew from Port Said at Mr. Eisenhower's behest.

The allusions in the President's message to the Soviet problem, in general, were also pregnant with implied admissions of error—the kind of error that his right-wing critics have been calling to his attention for nearly four years now. Mr. Eisenhower allowed as how his Administration had indulged the "hope" that the Soviet "pattern" would change after Stalin's death, but that such hopes had proved illusory. To illustrate what he meant by the Soviet pattern, the President read what for all the world sounded like a passage from Senator McCarthy's speech just prior to Geneva—a review of past Soviet conduct toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which McCarthy had cited to prove the folly of accepting Communist professions of peaceful intentions. At one point, Mr. Eisenhower sounded like Mr. Eisenhower—during the 1952 campaign: "The Soviet rulers continue to show that they do not scruple to use any means to gain their ends."

But what did the strong words mean?

On balance, right-wingers were more mystified than they were pleased by the President's message and by the proposed Joint Resolution he is asking Congress to sign. Granted that the President's depiction of the problem confronting the free world was reasonably faithful: still, on what showing is the "Eisenhower doctrine" apposite to the problem? What, it is being asked, is to be accomplished by this momentous delegation of congressional authority—what, that is, besides putting Congress on the shelf for the next six months where it won't get in anyone's way?

The proposal to increase spending on economic and military assistance for the Middle East was, of course, to be expected: more money is always one of the answers when a policy fails. But the money could have been got without the dramatics. The Administration may have been able, through area transfers, to secure from existing authorizations the funds it wants to spend in the Middle East during the next six months; if not, an additional authorization could no doubt have been squeezed out of Congress without too much trouble.

In any event, why the main proposal? Why the request for a blank

check from Congress concerning the use of U.S. troops against the remote possibility of "overt armed aggression" in the Middle East by a nation "controlled by international communism"? It is said that the President has scruples, constitutional ones, about going to war without congressional authorization. The answer you hear from some Congressmen is that it takes between four and five minutes to drive from the White House to Capitol Hill, which is where a President can find the Congress during the months it is in session. It is remarked, moreover, that last fall, when Congress was *not* in session, the Administration did not seem to mind particularly the absence of a prior congressional sanction for its policies: the President declined to call Congress into special session although the danger of a Soviet invasion of the Middle East was presumably greater then than it is now.

The main argument relied upon by the Administration is that, on the off-chance the Russians are planning a military invasion, an advance declaration of congressional opposition to such an attack might be useful as a deterrent. All right; but why didn't the President ask for that? Why


didn't the President request Congress to resolve that Congress would consider a Soviet invasion of the Middle East a *casus belli*—a solution that would have given the Middle East a status within the U.S. defense perimeter comparable to that which Western Europe and the SEATO area now enjoy? What the President did was to request authority to resist Soviet aggression, or *not* to resist it, as he sees fit. When it is remembered that the Soviets have greater reason to suspect the President of lacking nerve than the Congress, some Congressmen are wondering whether the delegation of Congress' authority to make war will not leave us with a lesser deterrent than existed before.

And these Congressmen cite a further reason for doubting that the Administration has really decided to get tough, namely: that while Congress is, for all practical purposes, to be eliminated in future U.S. Mideast policy-making, the United Nations, evidently, is not. Possibly the President did not mean the incredible thing he said about the role of the UN; but say it he unmistakably did: that in the event of "armed attack" by the Soviet Union, the President's decision as to whether to resist the


attack "would be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the Charter"—i.e., would be subject to the Soviet veto!

The tendency of this interpretation of the President's proposals, and their timing, is this: that while the resolution may represent, in part, a *bona fide* effort by the Administration to "do something" about the desperate Middle East crisis, however inadequate that something might be, the principal motivation for the resolution is nuisance prevention: an attempt to remove Congress' incentive to occupy itself with foreign policy matters for the duration of the session by getting Congress committed to what has been sold to the public as a new, dynamic, even panacean approach to the problem; to forestall the "Great Debate" on Middle East policy that many Democrats have been demanding; to keep the power of decision in hands the Administration considers safest, i.e., in its own.

If such is the thinking behind the Eisenhower Doctrine, then Congress, for all the President's harsh words about the Soviet Union, is probably being asked to provide ammunition for Mr. Eisenhower's popgun.



"Don't think of it as imbecility. Think of it as dynamic imbecility."



from WASHINGTON straight

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

The Knowland Decision

The post of majority or minority leader in the Senate is often an unhappy one. During the Truman regime, both Senator Scott Lucas of Illinois and Senator Ernest McFarland bit the political dust largely because they were responsible for furthering Truman's legislative proposals. Senator Taft, with his selfless efficiency, whipped the Senate Republicans into line for Eisenhower measures which went against the grain of his personal convictions. Senator Knowland, whose views are much closer to Taft's than to Eisenhower's, inherited his leadership as the only Senate Republican with the exception of Styles Bridges who could round up enough GOP votes to get a fairly solid front in support of any Administration program. Bridges, who has held all the top offices, including the majority leadership, wanted no part in the business of coordinating 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue with Capitol Hill.

It is an open secret that Senator Knowland has not enjoyed the task of persuading reluctant colleagues to go along with Eisenhower. Nor has he been *persona grata* with the White House. The President's advisers would like to see him replaced—and this is far from new—but they have been and are faced with the cold fact that none of the eager would-be replacements would be worth a tinker's damn in furthering the Administration program. So both Mr. Knowland and Mr. Eisenhower accept a situation without a practical alternative.

Senator Knowland's decision not to run for re-election in 1958 is generally regarded here as the opening move in a campaign for the California governorship in that year and the GOP Presidential nomination in 1960. There are unconfirmed rumors that there is an understanding between Governor Goodwin Knight and the Senator: that Knight will run for the Senate seat vacated by Knowland, who will therefore have relatively

clear sailing to Sacramento. Whether this is true or not, Knowland's election as Governor would assure him of the bulk of California's delegates to the next Republican Convention. It is theoretically possible for a candidate to be nominated without the support of his home state delegation but (and I may be mistaken) I know of no historic precedent. In any case, it would be extremely difficult. This is why Washington observers believe Dick Nixon may be caught in a squeeze play on a dead-end street.

The Fifth Estate?

Until recently small business was an unwanted orphan, generally placated with kind words by Congress and the Executive, but never accorded the treatment reserved for the major pressure groups: labor, veterans, farm organizations. But small business is growing up politically and is no longer to be pacified by empty promises.

In some respects the power of small business "just grew" like Topsy, but no small part of its new importance is due to John C. Davis, executive director of the National Small Businessmen's Association. Jack Davis is a first-class reporter, a competent political analyst, and a man who never needed a seeing-eye dog to find his way around Capitol Hill. There seems a very good chance that some of the major NSBA legislative objectives will be attained in the 85th Congress.

There will be a big drive for tax relief to permit the accumulation of working and equity capital, and the Congress will be confronted (and possibly embarrassed) by the platforms and pledges of both parties and both candidates. In view of Secretary Humphrey's adamant stand against tax reduction, there is not much chance of any tax relief during the first session. But the NSBA is looking forward to the congressional elections of 1958. It would like to see some record votes on taxes and other matters.

In this respect it contemplates the "punishment and reward" technique which has been a conspicuous failure when utilized by labor unions. But there is a vast difference between organized labor, with its autocratic and arbitrary powers, and a voluntary association of small businessmen who are fighting for their individual and collective existence.

The NSBA has a program which includes, in addition to the drive for tax reduction, the following legislative or administrative measures: payment of inheritance taxes over a ten-year period; fair-trade practice enforcement with sufficient teeth in the law to send the top executives of corporations that violate its provisions to prison on *prima facie* evidence; amendment of Security and Exchange regulations which require small businesses to go through the same expensive procedure of stock and bond floatations as the major corporations; a tax write-off on used equipment over a five-year period.

The NSBA is supporting the Sparkman tax relief bill (without illusive optimism); it is opposed to any increase in the lending facilities of the Small Business Administration on the grounds that in this era of full employment any banker who is worth his salt has a job and that any increment of federal personnel would of necessity be drafted from the culls of financial institutions and the spawn of bureaucratic nepotism.

Finally, the NSBA is utterly opposed to repeal or emasculation of Right-to-Work laws and favors strengthening of the Taft-Hartley Act, including, among other things, a provision that would limit the right to picket a struck plant to the employees of that plant.

I wouldn't care to predict how much or how little of the NSBA program will be attained in this Congress, but the once little orphan is a big boy now. Unlike Oliver Twist, he is going to get a second plate of porridge; if not now, later, and the later it gets the hungrier he will be.

Liberation: What Next?

We have entered on a new phase in the struggle for the world, Mr. Burnham contends, with unique opportunities for the West. We must get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe. Here is how . . .

JAMES BURNHAM

1. The Seven Year Stalemate

Just as we are enabled to define our youth only when an adult shock—marriage or a death or the need to make a living—marks the fact that it has ended, so in history we come to understand the nature of one period only when unexpected events show that another has begun. The events of the last four months of 1956 were of this pedagogic kind. It is not yet clear what *they* mean, but through them we may learn more clearly the meaning of what went before.

They inform us that for the Biblical span of seven years—from 1949 to 1956—the world struggle between Soviet-based Communism and the West had been stabilized on its European front. In the postwar flux prior to 1949 the Communist power drove westward into Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Finland, East Germany and Austria, while its advance elements penetrated Western Europe. The drive reached its flood in 1948, with the takeover of Czechoslovakia and the push (by civil war) through Greece toward the Eastern Mediterranean. It then receded slightly into an equilibrium with the counter-forces.

The units in Greece were driven back. The operations on the northern flank (Finland) and the southern (Turkey) halted. Yugoslavia became a no man's land. By 1949 there was, in broad outline, a stabilization, the result of a hardened resistance from the West that coincided with an exhausted Communist potential.

This stabilization—maintained only by the strenuous exertions of both sides—was not only geographical. It covered the domestic life of the West European nations, where it was shown by the slight reduction and then the freezing of the Communist vote.

Although the analysis here made is restricted to the European front, it may be added that the stabilization held more or less everywhere. In Asia the conquest of mainland China was completed in 1949. Tibet was only an appendage to China. North Vietnam was already under de facto Communist control by 1949, and the subsequent fighting merely transferred South Vietnam from French to American patronage.

From 1949 to 1956 all the furious actions—the Berlin blockade and airlift, the Korean war, the fighting in Indochina and Malaysia and Guatemala, all the programs of aid and subversion, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the arming and counter-arming—got nowhere at all. The outcome always expressed once again the prevailing stabilization.

The stalemate was summarized, and sealed, by the division of Germany, which no one challenged. Occasionally there was talk about German unification, but no one meant it. A divided or otherwise weakened Germany has always been attractive to France and Britain. Moscow and Washington were in a tacit but firm agreement not to upset the German status quo. They not only refrained from making any moves toward German reunification, but discouraged the respective German governments from making them. The NATO structure and NATO strategy assumed the truncated West Germany; and East Germany was the forward position of the Warsaw Pact. Whether justified or not in the context, the West German government's refusal to have any relations with the East German authorities of itself ruled out any serious step toward reunification.

The geopolitical stalemate on the European front was paralleled by the atomic stalemate—itself rather politi-

cal than technological; and both by a stalemate in ideas.

All the political and strategic ideas used by either side were introduced by 1949. Since then there have been only rhetorical variations. No important new idea in international politics appeared from 1949 to February 1956; and the one that then came into existence ("de-Stalinization") proved a dismal failure. The stalemate in ideas corresponded with the stalemate in fact; nothing new was happening, and nothing new was thought.

It was not only at the governmental level that ideas were stabilized. The ideas advocated outside of government—in the West, at any rate, where they may be observed—leveled off in 1949. Containment, coexistence, preventive war, appeasement, political warfare, liberation, world government, foreign aid. . . . Whether from anti-Communist, pro-Communist, or appeasement vineyards, they are all pre-1949 vintage.

2. Containment and Liberation

During the seven year stabilization the United States followed a basic policy of containment mixed with a trend toward coexistence and a small dash of liberation. Containment was variously implemented by rearmament, NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact (sponsored but not joined by the United States), foreign aid, partial economic boycott, diplomacy, and some fighting (Greece, Korea). Beginning in 1954 the coexistence admixture, always present in containment, became more obvious with the weakening of the boycott, increased cultural exchange, the Atoms for Peace Plan, Geneva spirit diplomacy, etc.

In the geographical sense containment was successful on the European

front from 1949 on; and, though with more churning, moderately successful even in Asia. This is proved by the map, although we may question whether geographical containment in the case of world Communism is worth much, successful or not.

In the containment policy there has also been present a certain seasoning of liberation. True enough, "liberation" in official policy has been largely confined to ceremonial rhetoric. Even so, the idea has had some political meaning. United States policy has never accepted the postwar Communist conquests as final. Within the seven year equilibrium the United States has continued to support an anti-Communist Taiwan in the East. In the West it has refused recognition to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic nations, and through semi-official covers (Free Europe Committee, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberation, Assembly of Captive European Nations, etc.) has kept the perspective of eventual liberation politically alive, however feeble.

Most "hard" critics have held that liberation, or the logically equivalent goal of the breakup of the Soviet Empire, should be the core instead of the decoration of American foreign policy. But these critics, while calling for massive psychological and political warfare, have not been very clear about how liberation (breakup) might actually come about. Implicitly they seem to suggest two possible circumstances of which liberation might be the resultant: a) general, all-out war; b) a spreading and mounting rebellion in which the West would become ultimately involved. Both of these circumstances—and they are perhaps the same, since the second would tend to lead into the first—might be called *catastrophic*.

It is true that if either of these circumstances should occur, and if the Soviet forces were defeated, then the liberation of the captive nations (perhaps including Russia) would result. Moreover, in such circumstances it is certain that the Western powers—if only for the most obvious military reasons—would swing to a policy of liberation. But it is also the case that the Western powers have renounced both general war and general rebellion as policy goals. Whether correct or not in some abstract sense, the two are excluded from deliberate

policy. And as a matter of fact it may well be that both sides of the struggle have ruled out general nuclear war as a *deliberate* choice.

3. *Liberation in the Flesh*

The "catastrophic" view of liberation is too doctrinaire, too merely black-and-white. In actuality there are degrees and measures. A nation can be more and less captive, more and less liberated. There can be partial steps toward, as well as a catastrophic plunge into, liberation. Within any nation, any change that weakens the control of Moscow and any step that loosens the Communist social structure is a step toward liberation.

Tito's break with Moscow was much short of liberation pure and simple, but it was a step toward liberation, and a weakening of the Soviet world power potential. This was immediately proved in Greece, where, with the Yugoslav sanctuary removed, a quick cleanup of the Moscow-run civil war became possible.

The recent virtual abandonment of the farm collectivization program in a number of the captive countries is a step of another kind, anti-Communist rather than merely anti-Moscow. Steps also are the greater freedom of religious worship, the limited resumption of religious education, the attack on "socialist realist" orthodoxy in the arts, abstentions in the UN, the effort to free the Polish economy from subordination to the Soviet five-year plans, the reappearance of non-Communist political activity. Armchair liberation can be a blinding flash, but real liberation is more likely to be a long, slow struggle, with many short steps and not a few big setbacks. A serious policy of liberation would not merely repeat grand phrases, but would push continuously in a certain *direction*: not resting content at any point short of a full break with both Moscow and Communism, but at the same time striving always to discover, promote, protect and reinforce any specific move that led toward greater freedom from either.

4. *The Equilibrium Unhorsed*

In the final third of 1956 the seven year equilibrium was upset, stabilization was replaced by fluidity, and new paths once more began to open. The

primary break—or potential break—occurred in Eastern Europe. In the stabilization one factor had been overlooked: the East European peoples. Moscow, Washington, London, Paris, Leipzig and Bonn had been willing to let things stand. But the East Europeans, led by the Poles and Hungarians, were not.

On the main front in 1956, the Soviet line wavered in disorder. On the right (southern) flank, a second potential break simultaneously appeared, but on the Western side. Soviet infiltration threatened the Western lines in the Middle East. The entire front from the Baltic to the Indian Ocean became suddenly fluid, and so continues.

From both sides the initial responses have been desperate attempts to restabilize, to reconstitute the equilibrium. Both sides, heavy as they are with bureaucratized inertia, behave as if terrified by the new fluidity, by the demand of a new situation for a new answer. The West, by the abortive Anglo-French lunge, quickly superseded by the American UN-cum-dollars technique, tries to patch the Mideast wall. On the main—the East European—front, Moscow stumbles from one to another improvisation.

In the glaring light of Hungary, we may now see that the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, with its de-Stalinization turn, and even the earlier Geneva coexistence line, were preventive moves attempting to forestall the breakup of the 1949 stabilization. At a later stage (November 1956) Moscow publicly withdrew its (quite empty) "threat" to send volunteers to the Middle East exactly as NATO publicly disavowed any "threat" to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe.

In 1955 an unexpected and never explained move had foreshadowed what was to come late in 1956. On Feb. 25, 1955, the Soviet Union, after ten years of rigidity, suddenly proposed new negotiations on Austria. These were immediately successful. A general treaty was signed, and all four of the occupation armies were withdrawn by the end of the year.

What was the Soviet motive for this abrupt shift on Austria? It is impossible to be sure. Partly it was in accord with the then developing coexistence talk. But the Communists

have never been known to sacrifice geography to propaganda. And geographically the result of the Austrian agreement was a *Soviet retreat*—a shortening of the line against trouble in the offing. By the treaty, of course, the Western as well as the Soviet troops withdrew. Austria was “neutralized,” and her arming restricted, with a prohibition on nuclear and offensive weapons. Moscow imposed heavy economic terms. The fact remains that, with the Soviet troops gone, Austria as a nation did not remain politically neutral or go toward Communism, but swung to the West. With a significance plain now though not in 1955, the European front of the world struggle, shifting a few thousand square miles to the East, reached the border of Hungary.

5. The Next Steps

Eastern Europe, where the first two world wars had their origin, is the main axis of the struggle for the world. If the Communist hold on that deciding area is finally consolidated, then Communism will win world domination. But if the Communist hold there is broken and Eastern Europe rescued for the West, Communism will fail in the end no matter what temporary advances it makes among the masses of Asia and Africa.

By what has happened in Austria, in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, we now know that Communist control in Central and Eastern Europe rests on, and only on, Soviet armed might. This we could not know before, but could only hope or doubt; and the reality goes further than the most sanguine prior hopes. And when it is asked whether the Hungarians died in vain, the first part of the answer is plain: Never before in history did an unorganized force of irregulars, at the cost of 20,000 casualties, destroy sixty divisions.

If the Soviet troops get out of the now captive nations, and if there is a fair assurance that they will stay out, then these nations will move away from the Soviet-Communist orbit. The conclusion follows: the supreme present objective of Western policy should be to get the Soviet troops out of Central and Eastern Europe, as far back as the 1939 Soviet boundary. (I limit this analysis to the captive nations west of the 1939

boundary. The problem of, for example, the Ukraine does not differ essentially from the problem of Poland or Hungary, but from the practical standpoint of political timing it must be put in a different category.)

But the status quo in Eastern Europe is sealed by and rests on the division of Germany. For the Soviet troops to get out of Eastern Europe entails “a solution of the German problem”—that is, the reunification of East and West Germany, and a negotiated agreement among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the East German (Oder-Neisse) boundary.

These, then, are the next great steps in the journey toward liberation and the defeat of the Communist plan of world conquest: the reunification of Germany, the negotiation of the East German boundary, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and the captive nations.

But how could these steps be taken, granted the Western decision against a direct risk of war? Fortunately an actual test suggests the answer: by applying and generalizing “the Austrian formula.” That is, by the military neutralization of Central and Eastern Europe, including all Germany: withdrawing therefrom all Western along with all Soviet occupation troops, guaranteeing against their re-entry, and restricting the nations of the area to police and defensive armament.

Neutralization is not only an obvious precondition for a Soviet agreement to withdraw. It is also required from the point of view of the East European nations themselves, in order to remove what they inevitably see as “the German threat.” A latent fear of a rearmed and aggressive Germany slows their movement away from Moscow, and even prompts a voluntary wish that Soviet troops remain. A German boundary settlement and military neutralization go integrally together. It should not be overlooked that after he had signed the new agreement covering the Soviet garrisons in Poland, Premier Gomulka stated without apology: “They are here to protect the Oder-Neisse boundary.”

Because of the sudden fluidity of the European front, and because that fluidity endangers the Soviet much more than the Western line, these objectives are now attainable if they

are made primary in Western policy. They will not always be attainable. For the moment the Kremlin has lost control of the situation on its European front. But given time and no interference, it will regain command, and restabilize the front or even turn the new flux against the West.

6. The Lead is Germany's

The central objective of Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe translates then into the combined derived objectives of: reunification of Germany; friendly relations between Germany and the East European nations, initiated by peaceful negotiation of the Oder-Neisse boundary; military neutralization of Central and Eastern Europe. The lead in a campaign for these objectives would have to be taken by Germany, backed presumably by the United States and preferably by all the major NATO powers. Several German measures would become immediately relevant, and it is significant that during the past three months Bonn has made tentative moves toward some of these, as if driven by the imperatives of the new fluid situation.

For example, West Germany would have to try to enter into a “dialogue” with Poland: concerning the boundary first of all, but broadening quickly to include cultural, political and economic subjects more generally. Stepped-up German relations with the other captive nations, and with Yugoslavia, would be in order, and discussions in terms of a regional perspective.

Unquestionably Bonn would have to reverse its established attitude toward the East German government. The West, by choice and by default, has ruled out a German reunification imposed by superior strength or war. Therefore, if reunification is to come by some other route, negotiation between East and West Germany cannot be avoided, whatever the formalities at stake. The truth is in any case that Bonn's refusal to deal with East Germany has become purely doctrinaire, and yields nothing. Indeed, it protects the East German Communists, and reinforces a wall that West Germany has every reason to want torn down. West Germany can only gain from expanding its relations with East Germany, up to

and inclusive of the relation of unification, on whatever terms it might be achieved. Take away the Soviet troops, put East and West Germany in a political scale, and there is little doubt which way the balance will incline.

In an additional drastic reversal, West Germany, with the NATO powers' consent, would have to be ready to give up its rearmament program within the NATO structure—provided, of course, that the objectives of reunification and Soviet withdrawal were attained. There is reason to believe that most Germans would accept this condition without any great regret.

7. What Success Could Mean

The policy here-proposed is not an abandonment of the general strategy of liberation (conceived as the means to counter the Communist threat of world conquest), but an application of that strategy to political realities and specifically to the fluid condition arising from the break in the seven year stabilization of the European front. If this policy were successful, then the captive European nations (outside the 1939 Soviet boundary) would have been partially liberated, however Communist their governments in the first stage. As Hungary proves in reverse, they would be in a position incomparably more favorable than at present for completing the transition to full liberation.

The West would have a chance to reconstitute Europe, which does not exist under the present division. East Europe, the strategic key to the world Heartland, if not yet returned to Western hands, would be again within Western reach. The front, the real front, would touch the borders of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, and these captive nations would become the potential Polands or Hungaries of the next phase.

World Communism would have suffered a defeat that might remain for a while hidden—even from Moscow—but would, as Austria proves, soon become known and marked. The two unblinkable facts would be: the East European nations would have repudiated Moscow and the world Communist leadership; the Soviet armies would have retreated.

8. What Would Moscow Say?

But why should the Communists accept a proposal from which the West gains and they lose? In the first place, the loss is from their point of view neither unmixed nor irrecoverable. Under the proposal, the Soviet Union would be insured, at least for a period, against a German military threat of which Russians are always aware. On the western Soviet border there would be a line of nations which, if they did not remain friendly or docile, would be unable to do direct military harm. Central and Eastern Europe would become for a period a buffer zone. The chance of a general nuclear war (which the Kremlin knows that it would be sure to lose) would be still further diminished. Along with a greater freedom of maneuver in non-European parts of the world, Moscow might hope to get a badly needed moral credit.

Such real or seeming factors would sweeten the withdrawal. However, the chief reason for thinking that Moscow might accept the combined proposal rests on the fact that the Soviet Union is in trouble, grave trouble, first of all in Eastern Europe but inside the home boundaries as well. The Kremlin's failure to solve the problems of the succession following Stalin's death has badly cracked its internal structure. The Soviet Union is over-extended, economically, politically and militarily. It needs to shorten its lines, literally as well as figuratively; to draw back in the hope of recuperating for wider thrusts tomorrow.

The Kremlin's problem can be put in another way. The Soviet Union has *already*—in late 1956—suffered a colossal defeat in Eastern Europe. To withdraw under the circumstances is only to accept the normal consequences of the defeat, particularly if at the same time the West smooths the way by offering a good sum as bonus.

Moreover, if the combined proposal—for reunification, withdrawal, and military neutralization—were pushed as a continuous political campaign, Moscow might not be able to reject it in any case. This proposal corresponds with the ardent wishes of almost all East Europeans. It would give them a chance to get out from under the Soviet armament burden that has

been crushing them economically. It is non-provocative and "reasonable" in form. Without being abstractly pacifist, it would be a major move away from nuclear war. As such, it would be favorably looked on by the lesser powers, committed and uncommitted. From both inside and outside Soviet boundaries, Moscow would be under formidable pressure.

But if Moscow, on whatever basis, refused? Her net loss, if not immediately geographical, would then be only the more certain. As in the case of all correctly conceived political warfare operations, this proposal is designed to win either way: whether it is accepted or rejected. In relation to its own subjects, the captive peoples and the rest of the world, rejection would leave the Soviet Union in an isolated political position most difficult to defend. A determined Western political campaign for the combined proposal would, at the minimum, sustain the fluidity in Eastern Europe from which the West inevitably benefits.

9. Is There a Serious Alternative?

Reunification of Germany; negotiation of the eastern German boundary; withdrawal of all occupation (foreign) troops from all of Central and Eastern Europe; military neutralization of the entire area. These four measures summarize the policy proposal here suggested as the most promising response that could be made by the United States and its allies to the chance offered by the sudden fluidity of the European front. This proposal, unlike many otherwise persuasive plans for meeting the Soviet challenge that have been offered in the past, is within the limits of real possibility: that is, the axiomatic system of the American and allied Western leaders does not automatically rule it out of consideration. It is not fantastic to think of the Eisenhower Administration adopting this proposal in substance, though no doubt reworked into the terms of the prevailing pacifist and UN rhetoric—which might even have certain advantages, if the substance were kept intact.

Hard anti-Communists also have their problem of rhetorical inertia.

(Continued on p. 71)

The Middle Way: A Political Meditation

The "middle way," says Professor Weaver, leads Liberalism to mindlessness. It is the shortest route to political and spiritual deterioration

RICHARD M. WEAVER

The return of the Eisenhower party to office makes inevitable a fresh look at the "middle of the road" as a viable political philosophy. Whether the espoused doctrine of moderation, rather than special circumstances, was responsible for either of its victories is, of course, highly arguable. Yet there are many who see in it the cause of success, and the recent elevation of Arthur Larson, who sounds the official philosophy of moderation, to a post of influence will doubtless lend countenance to their claim.

All this is profoundly troubling to those who believe that keeping midway between the two sides of a basic debate has grave theoretical liabilities, and that in the long run theory is going to assert its claims. The question is not whether but *when* a party which has no guide line except "moderation" is going to meet an issue from which there is no refuge in the middle of the road.

Everyone notices that the middle position is sought by those who are uncomfortable with ideas and the oppositions which these entail. They try to get as far as possible from the two sides of an issue. To comfort themselves with, they have an old saw, not respectable logically, but useful to temporize with: "the truth is always found somewhere in between." But in between what?

The assumption, to the extent that it ever gets clarified, seems to be that when two sides are engaged in a clear-cut controversy, each one must be approximately half right and half wrong. The wise man therefore takes a portion of what each has and with these constructs a middle road of wisdom. This is not only safe, it is also easy, for one never has to undergo the sometimes arduous work of defining a position independently. That labor can be left to "extremists," of whom the conservative is pictured as one. The Moderate fancies that in

keeping away from clearly defined and deeply anchored views, he is keeping away from errors.

But this involves a dangerous misunderstanding of the nature of alternatives, as was pointed out by a great thinker two thousand years ago. Plato had occasion to face this question in the *Euthydemus*, and his analysis is well worth calling to the attention of present advocates of the in-between course.

All persons or things which are intermediate between two other things and participate in both of them are thus: if one of these things is good and the other evil, the participant is better than the one and worse than the other; but if it is in a mean between two things which do not tend toward the same end, it falls short of either of its component elements in the attainment of these ends. Only in the case when the two components which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either.

Plato says in this passage that he is talking about "people who do not understand the nature of intermediates." They are the ones who have not analyzed reality enough to see that the middle position is not necessarily the best one.

The Liberal's Dilemma

Within the frame of this analysis, the dilemma of the Liberal "middle-of-the-roader" emerges as a true one. Let us put him to the test in a choice concerning the most fundamental conflict dividing the world today, whose sides may be denominated "individual freedom" and "collectivist dictatorship."

If he admits that the first of these is good and the second evil, he takes a position inferior to the first when he chooses a position between them. If he maintains that both are good but have different objectives (and this seems to be the philosophy be-

hind coexistence), then his middle position is inferior to both, since it cannot achieve either end as well as the two defined positions. He has the remaining choice of saying that though they tend toward different ends, both are evil, so that the middle position is a means of keeping away from either end. Obviously if he chooses this alternative, he discloses what he really thinks about freedom.

Some imagine that this problem is solved in favor of "moderation" by Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a mean found between two extremes. But Aristotle is talking about positions which *do* lie between two evils, one of excess and one of deficiency. Thus "resoluteness," lying in a mean between "rashness" and "cowardice," is better than either of them; and "generosity," lying midway between "prodigality" and "niggardliness" is likewise. But Aristotle goes on to point out that there are some things whose badness is implied in their names, so that one can never be right with regard to them. There is no happy medium in doing a thing which is essentially wrong. There is no time, occasion, or manner which justifies it. For those who believe that collectivist dictatorship invades an area of inviolable liberty, collectivist dictatorship is this kind of thing. There is no right measure of this invasion; it is not justified even through invoking the modern talisman "security."

The prophets of the New Republicanism, as pointed out in a recent editorial in *NATIONAL REVIEW*, insist that the Republican Party keep moving to the left behind (but not far behind) the Democratic Party. They assume that the desirable middle ground is to be found just to the right of wherever the Democratic Party happens to take its stand. They do not bother to ask whether the leftward drift is not toward something essen-

tially bad, so that there is no happy intermediate with regard to it. It is a curious piece of political servility and blindness.

The blindness comes from ignoring the fact that just as some things are bad in themselves, others are good in themselves, and these derive their whole force from their existence as clear-cut ideals. Try lowering them ever so little, and they are vitiated. The fact that they are never wholly realized in the world is not a reflection upon them, but upon the infirmity of man. The essential freedom of the individual is this kind of thing, not wholly realizable at any time, but not to be bartered away by concessions to a wholly different kind of thing.

In one of the satires of Anatole France, there is a story about a girl who is charged with having an illegitimate child. Her defense is that it was "only a tiny one." This seems a fair parody of the Liberal rationalization. For the philosophical bankruptcy of modern Liberalism comes from a confusing of categories, from supposing that what is wrong in principle can be made right by a little quantitative balancing. Most Liberals have in fact imbibed large doses of positivism, and this seems to have effectually destroyed their faith in ideas. They tend increasingly to derive their political philosophy from physical analogies, of which "the middle of the road" is a fair example. As a result of this, the Liberal arrives at the notion that there are no truths, but only accommodations of physical forces. Facts can exist together; it is ideas which are irreconcilable. Therefore he tries to get rid of ideas as things deriving ultimately from metaphysics and therefore without significance. The right plan is to harmonize forces, and stop worrying about ideas, which in a positivist's world are only epiphenomena.

The Vector of Forces

Hence most of the Liberals are impressed with the bulk and force of the Soviet Union. But impressed in this way: the Soviet Union is a force to be accommodated, if not indeed to be imitated. Already we have had sly suggestions that we ought to revise our educational methods with an eye to Soviet "achievement." Circum-

stance is not only the last, it is the only refuge of those who have given up faith in ideas.

Such loss of faith explains the progressive abandonment, in education and elsewhere, of the criteriological sciences, like logic and ethics. So we witness attempts to dissolve logic into psychology, psychology into biology, biology into chemistry, and chemistry into physics. This is, as Professor L. G. Collingwood pointed out years ago, "the propaganda of irrationalism." Where physics is the sole matrix, elements cannot be in logical opposition, but only in physi-

cal union and equilibrium. In a world so reduced, what one looks for is the vector sum of forces. And the vector sum of forces is the middle of the road. If this should become the predominant world view, it is evident that the whole moral and dramatic picture of life as a struggle between good and evil would have to go, for these concepts are determined only through logical discourse. Where the vector of forces is the supreme object of search, there would be no need for deliberative assemblies. All you would need is a reasonably good mathematical physicist.

Descent into Mindlessness

So New Republicanism looks very much like a typical product of the "operational thinker." The "operational thinker" does not really think; he senses. Like an insect with its antennae, he can detect the impingement of circumstances and the drift of things. The real question is whether his goal can ever be anything more than insect living. On the human plane, the goals of life have to be arrived at dialectically; that is, through investigating and comparing the implications of propositions. That kind of thinking never rests halfway between contradictories. It may not be able to carry out a proposition completely and at once, but it does not therefore discard all propositions. That, again, is the act of irrationalism.

It seems clear that "the middle of the road" is one of the guises worn by relativism. And relativism is the means by which Liberalism is descending into mindlessness. Somewhere in its course Liberalism succumbed to a sentimentalism which caused it to ignore the structure of reality. Sentimentalism always allows feeling undisciplined by intelligence to obscure the nature of things. The more it ignored the structure of reality, the more it went into debt, so to speak, for its extravagances. Finally, the only way out was to repudiate the debt by denying the creditor. This it has done by saying that courses do not have to be justified by theory. That may do well enough until someone comes along who has both a practice and a theory. Then, as Charles Péguy once said, "We shall learn metaphysics by the firing of rifles."

On Not Knowing What Lies About Us

When it first appeared,
The Waste Land seemed
weird;
Ghoulish, sinister, a thing
to be feared.
After a time, its drab
despair
Became increasingly hard
to bear.
Now, thirty-five years later,
It strikes one more
Like the beard of a pater,
or satyr.
Now, with life fissioned
and planned,
It seems healthy and
tanned.
Its wet sand seems
grand,
And its dry, quite
Araby.
Now, its mountains teem,
Its dry rocks steam,
Its red faces beam,
Its carious teeth gleam.
Now, its bleats
Seem more like sweets
Out of Keats.
Its dead sailor haler,
not paler.
And probably less squalor
Than you'll find in a trailer,
or Mailer.

JOHN ABBOT CLARK

Who Will Liberate Us?

EUGENE LYONS

In the last or cold-war decade we have heard a lot of talk about "saving" and "liberating" the peoples under the Kremlin yoke. But when the great tests came—first in East Germany and then, even more challengingly, in Hungary—the talk was exposed as hollow and largely hypocritical. If anything is clear today it is that the so-called free world, suffering paralysis of the will, itself needs saving and liberating.

The decades—nearly four—since the advent of Soviet Communism, have witnessed magnificent courage and readiness to stake life for liberty. Millions of ordinary people have traded their blood for honor and conviction. But this glory and this nobility has been manifest only on the dark side of the Iron Curtain.

East Berlin in 1953; Tiflis and Poznan and Budapest in 1956; the slave revolts in Vorkuta; the heroic escapes from Communist prisonlands; the stubborn peasant resistance to state feudalization in Soviet Russia and all the other captive countries; these have been historic assertions of the human spirit. Where in the free world are the episodes of individual or national valor to compare with them?

A journalist in West Berlin, assessing the mood in East Germany today, is able to write: "Ideas are the weapons most likely to be Ulbricht's undoing—genuine European ideas, nourished behind the Iron Curtain, that are storming in from the East across the long Polish frontier."

The ideas flowing from the East—the very Sovietized East that had been written off by most of our experts as lost to our civilization—are no different from those offered by the West. They are, in truth, merely reaffirmations of the basic values of freedom, justice and human dignity by which Western man has lived for centuries. Why, then, do they have such a powerful impact upon East German minds which are little if at all affected by freedom propaganda from the West?

Because behind the Iron Curtain

these elementary ideas are being given spiritual vigor by ultimate dedication and ultimate risk. Because there the tired platitudes of the Judaeo-Christian world are being revitalized through self-sacrifice so spontaneous and uncalculating that heroism seems the inappropriate word for it.

Heroism implies a conscious choice, whereas the victims of Communism protest, demand and fight in response to imperious inner compulsions. A correspondent of the *Commonweal* who witnessed the struggle in Budapest reports that the people "fought with a superhuman spirit without hope from the beginning." It was "as if they fulfilled a function, the meaning of which was still obscure, but which had to be fulfilled."

The free world needs saving precisely because, in the face of a challenge to all its professed beliefs and ideals, it feels no such inner compulsions to act. Our best hope today is that the oppressed men, women and children in the Soviet world may liberate us. Their suffering and sacrifice in defiance of physical force may yet drive us to put duty and honor above comfort and security.

The proof that there is still a flicker of life in the anemic ideals we think we cherish is that we are deeply ashamed of our failure to answer the calls for help that reached us from Hungary, and are trying to smother the shame with angry rhetoric, ritual resolutions and above all, mumblings about "moral force."

American organizations raising funds for Hungarian relief report a remarkably generous response. In other non-Soviet countries, too, the response has been impressive. Governments which have been scandalously indifferent to the fate of fugitives from Communism are suddenly opening their doors wide to Hungarian refugees. We are today like men who, having watched the obscene murder of a neighbor without daring to interfere, rush to help his widow and orphans.

Certainly there is ample reason for our feeling of guilt. The gallantry of Poles and Hungarians, increasingly in evidence also among students and workers in Soviet Russia itself, has been matched among free men only by a sullen determination to play it safe.

Even the toothless League of Nations in Geneva found the courage to expel Russia after its invasion of Finland, but not its successor in New York after the Hungarian massacres. History must record that while Soviet tanks and guns were slaughtering tens of thousands of freedom fighters, the pettifogging lawyers of the so-called civilized world were bargaining over the wording of "rebukes" to the butchers. The presumptive leader of the freedom forces among the nations, though it acted promptly and firmly against its friends in Suez, could find only wrathful adjectives against the sworn enemy of humankind engaged in crushing a brave people.

The peoples under Red puppet regimes and in Soviet Russia itself now know that should they, too, revolt against despotism, the free world stands ready to applaud them, to pass resolutions, to ring church bells and provide relief handouts for survivors—in short, to do anything except risk its own precious skin.

Free peoples are no less culpable than their governments. Where are the volunteers against Communism to match those raised by the Communists during the Spanish civil war? Where are the fund drives for arms and planes to match those raised for Israel in its fight against the British and the Arabs? Where is the current equivalent of the Flying Tigers in China?

I for one am convinced that while the inertia and cowardice of the free world may slow up self-liberation in the Communist world, they cannot prevent it. Despite official warnings by Washington and Bonn and NATO that rebellion against Red tyranny and terror cannot count on outside support, despite the eagerness of free-world statesmen to help Moscow "stabilize" its slave empire, the collapse of Communist power is inevitable.

And in the process we, too, may be saved and liberated.

THE LAW OF THE LAND

C. DICKERMAN WILLIAMS

The Tennessee Contempt Proceedings

The contempt proceedings recently instituted in the Federal Court for Eastern Tennessee to punish alleged violations of an injunction issued by that Court raise important questions of constitutional law and of federal-state relationships. The injunction forbade interference with the efforts of the local school authorities to provide integrated education as required by a previous order of the Court. Mr. Arthur Krock, in a column in the *New York Times* and an article in *U. S. News and World Report*, has suggested the following questions:

1. Integrated education has been ordered by the Supreme Court under the authority of that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding the states to deny any person the "equal protection of the laws." The Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enforce its provisions by "appropriate legislation." What right has the judiciary to enforce the Amendment?

2. How may the judiciary enforce an injunction against private individuals who were not parties to the litigation in which the injunction was issued?

3. Are the alleged contemnors entitled to a jury trial?

4. Inasmuch as the Fourteenth Amendment forbids state action, how may it be enforced against private individuals not acting under the authority of any state but apparently contrary to the endeavors of those state officials who do have authority in the premises?

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread." It is extremely hazardous to express an opinion on these questions on the basis of newspaper reports and in a single page, but it is possible to suggest a few judicial and statutory landmarks that appear to have some relevance. Taking up the questions in order:

1. The federal courts have frequently issued injunctions against state officials on the authority of the

Fourteenth Amendment alone and without the additional authority of "appropriate legislation" enacted by Congress. For instance, a body of law developed in the 1880's and thereafter under which the federal courts enjoined state officials from taking the property of railroad and utility corporations "without due process of law" by fixing unduly low rates. And discriminatory taxes have been enjoined on the ground that the taxpayer was denied the "equal protection of the laws."

2. Injunctions have on a number of occasions been enforced against private individuals not parties to the suit in which the injunction was issued. A federal court has expressed the rationale of this doctrine thus:

It is entirely consonant with reason, and necessary to maintain the dignity, usefulness, and respect of a court, that any person, whether a party to a suit or not, having knowledge that a court of competent jurisdiction has ordered certain persons to do or to abstain from doing certain acts, cannot intentionally interfere to thwart the purposes of the court in making such order. Such an act, independent of its effect upon the rights of the suitors in the case, is a flagrant disrespect to the court which issues it, and an unwarrantable interference with and obstruction to the orderly and effective administration of justice, and as such is and ought to be treated as a contempt of the court which issued the order.

In the case from which this quotation is taken, the court sustained the contempt conviction of a man who was not a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued and who acted independently of the parties.

3. Section 3961 of the Federal Criminal Code provides for a jury trial in contempt cases when "the act or thing done or omitted [according to the accusation] also constitutes a criminal offense under any Act of Congress, or under the laws of any state in which it was done or omitted." In the Tennessee cases the newspaper reports suggest that the "act or thing" of which the present defendants are

accused would constitute the offense of breach of the peace under the laws of Tennessee.

The right to a jury trial does not apply in prosecutions for contempt of a decree made in a suit brought by the United States. However, the suit in which the present injunction was issued seems to have been brought by private citizens.

The constitutional validity of Section 3961 (originally enacted as Section 22 of the Clayton Act) was the subject of a scholarly article by Justice Felix Frankfurter and Mr. James M. Landis in the June 1924 issue of the *Harvard Law Review*. Justice Frankfurter was at that time a Professor at the Harvard Law School and Mr. Landis a student there. According to this article—and its citation of precedents begins with a note of a contempt prosecution recorded in the roll of the Eyre of Kent for the years 1313-1314—the jury was an invariable feature of contempt prosecutions from the inception of the common law until a certain confusion was introduced by the practice of the Court of Star Chamber in the reign of Charles I in trying contempt cases without a jury. The authors condemned this Star Chamber practice and any embodiment of it in the procedures of the federal courts.

4. The Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly provides prohibitions only against action by the states. In this connection the "state" is deemed to include all official organizations created by the state, such as cities, villages, school boards, etc. And beginning with the Civil Rights Cases, decided in 1883, the Supreme Court has refused to find in its provisions a basis for restrictions on private individuals. In an ordinary case of private interference with a school board endeavoring to effect integrated education, there would seem no basis for federal punishment. When, however, a federal court has granted a decree against a particular school board requiring it to provide integrated education, interference with the board's compliance might be penalized not on the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment as such, but as tending to "thwart the purposes of the court" under the doctrine stated in "2" above.

The arguments in the Tennessee cases may proceed along these lines.

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Babbitt Read Anew

Let me blow my own trumpet today—a feeble blast anyway, auxiliary to a great flourish for the late Irving Babbitt. For Babbitt's first book, *Literature and the American College: Essays in Defense of the Humanities*, has just appeared as a paperback (Gateway Editions, Henry Regnery Company, \$1.25), with an introduction by your servant. Most of the chapters of this book, which ushered in the intellectual movement called American Humanism, were written more than half a century ago; and the book itself was published in 1908.

The only literary Babbitt known to most literate or quasi-literate Americans is our old friend George F., created by Sinclair Lewis. There is some reason for believing that Babbitt's enemies in *avant-garde* circles, who endeavored to represent the learned and dignified Irving Babbitt as the representative of bourgeois crassness, may have persuaded Lewis to employ the name Babbitt for the dreary businessman in his novel; certainly Lewis first intended to use another name for his character. In any event, Irving and George F. stand at opposite poles in American character. "A few more Harrimans, and we are undone," Irving Babbitt wrote once. He might have said the same thing about a few thousand more George F. Babbitts. All this Babbitt is somewhat confusing; and it has been made more so by Mr. Peter Viereck (one of the more ardent admirers of Irving Babbitt among the rising generation of writers), who sometimes praises Irving and denounces George on the same page. As if this were not enough, Mr. Viereck has created two more Babbitts, yclept Gaylord and Cabot, to stand for twentieth-century ritualistic liberalism and snobbery.

Well, when I say Babbitt, I mean Irving Babbitt, once professor of French literature at Harvard, and no one else. One of the best essays on Babbitt ever written is contained in

a recent book by Mr. Austin Warren, *New England Saints* (University of Michigan Press). Another appreciation is to be found in Dr. Lynn Harold Hough's *Great Humanists*. After many years of neglect, Babbitt to some degree has come into his own at Harvard, for President Nathan Pusey was one of Babbitt's students.

"What is Humanism?" This is the title of the first chapter of *Literature and the American College*. To put it briefly, humanism is the belief that man is a distinct being, governed by laws peculiar to his nature; there is law for man, and law for thing. Man stands higher than the beasts that perish because he recognizes and obeys this law of his nature. The disciplinary arts of *humanitas* teach man to put checks upon his will and his appetite. Those checks are provided by reason—not the private rationality of the Enlightenment, but the higher reason which grows out of a respect for the wisdom of our ancestors and out of the endeavor to apprehend that transcendent order which gives us our nature. The sentimentalist, who would subject man to the rule of impulse and passion; the pragmatic materialist, who would treat man as a mere edified ape; the levelling enthusiast, who would reduce human personality to a collective mediocrity; these are the enemies of true human nature, and against them Babbitt directed this book and all his other books.

For Babbitt, the great end of education is ethical. In the college, as at all other levels of the educational process, the student learns the difference between good and evil. It is this humane tradition and discipline which maintains a decent civil social order. Babbitt felt, Dean Hough writes, "that he lived in a world where undisciplined and expansive emotion was running riot." This world was proceeding to dedicate itself to the study of subhuman relationships,

which it mistook for the whole of life; it was sinking into a meaningless estheticism and a mean vocationalism.

Against the humanist, Babbitt set the humanitarian. The humanist struggles to develop, by an act of will, the higher nature in man; the humanitarian, however, believes in "outer working and inner *laissez faire*," material gain and emancipation from ethical checks. What the humanist desires is a working in the soul of man; what the humanitarian seeks is the gratification of appetites. Bacon symbolized for Babbitt the utilitarian aspect of humanitarianism, the lust for power over society and physical nature; Rousseau symbolized for him the sentimental aspect of humanitarianism, the treacherous impulse to break what Burke called "the contract of eternal society" and to substitute for moral obligation the worship of a reckless egoism.

According to Paul Elmer More, the central sentence in the whole body of Babbitt's writings is this: "The greatest of vices, according to Buddha, is the lazy yielding to the impulses of temperament (pamada): the greatest virtue (appamada) is the opposite awakening from the sloth and lethargy of the senses, the constant exercise of the active will." To egoism and appetite, which so oppress our time, Babbitt opposed humanism, the study of man's essential nature, with its strict ethical disciplines.

This theme is illustrated by Babbitt in a great variety of ways. His observations on leisure, on originality, on the classics, on the doctor's degree, and on the study of literature, written more than half a century ago, remain wonderfully pertinent in our age, witty and urbane. We are fifty years closer to that total collapse of humane disciplines which Babbitt, in an era of optimism, foresaw as a grim possibility. The very imminence of our peril has awakened some minds to the veracity of his prophecies. Will and appetite have had their way unchecked in a great part of the world, and humanism fights only a rear-guard action here in America. Whether we can restore order in personality and in society depends, in some part, on whether there still exists among us a remnant sufficiently educated to understand Babbitt's words, and sufficiently resolute to clothe them with flesh.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

Man Against Various Gods

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

The late Major Edwin Howard Armstrong, pioneer in the development of Hi-fi broadcasting and inventor of the "feedback" amplifying circuit upon which modern radio reception rests, was a man against the gods. His life, as set forth by Lawrence Lessing in an eloquent and impassioned biography called *Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong* (Lippincott, \$5.00), is a Greek tragedy in its overtones—though Mr. Lessing, an environmentalist in most of his judgments, never quite sees that his hero was up against something far more elemental than "society."

In his sixty-fourth year Armstrong, tired out from a lifetime of complex invention, and never-ending patent litigation, dressed himself neatly in hat, overcoat, scarf and gloves and walked out of a thirteenth-story window in New York City to his death. Mr. Lessing, though he has occasional things to say about "furies" and "demons" and rejection-by-the-father, tends to place the blame for the suicide on the "corporations." "They"—Mr. Lessing thinks of them in quotation marks—"they" had denied Armstrong justice by refusing to recognize his patent priorities and denying him royalties. The Radio Corporation of America in particular had sinned by refusing to cooperate with Armstrong in giving frequency modulation, with its high fidelity radio sound reception, commercial priority over television.

In his partisanship for the creative individual Mr. Lessing has many penetrating things to say about the deadening effect of huge modern organization on the waywardly inventive spirit. But in his animus against the "corporations" he tends to build a case that won't stand up against the facts. It is incontestable that some corporations treated Armstrong abominably. But others did handsomely by him—and even those which lacerated his spirit paid him very well for most of his life. Materially his society rewarded him as few inventors have been rewarded. And, even though the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled against his "feedback" circuit patent in an incredibly stupid opinion written by Justice

Cardozo, Armstrong always had the admiration and backing of his peers in the electronic world.

Since he had both riches and recognition in plenty, it was something else that gnawed at Armstrong's vitals. What was it? Mr. Lessing thinks it was a desire for justice, not for himself in any narrow sense, but for his "brain children" as the better part of his being. This was a most praiseworthy desire. But two questions immediately arise. The first is, should a man fight for perfect justice for himself to the point of impoverishing his own spirit? The second question is a double one: who or what was Armstrong's enemy, and was the enemy worthy of the awesome compliment embodied in the drastic riposte—or deference—of the suicide?

The craving for personal justification is innate in human beings. But most people, when they cannot get it, swallow the affront and go on to other things. A hundred years and more before there were any great modern corporations Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin. He had clear title to it, but he found he couldn't collect his royalties on back country gins without spending a small fortune in policing the forks of every creek

in the Carolinas and Georgia. Stung as Armstrong was later stung, Whitney groused for a period. Then, reviving his spirit, he developed the system of making interchangeable parts for guns, became a great name in the industrial society of the time, founded a company that still exists as the Whitney Blake Company, and otherwise lived a happy and creative life.

For Armstrong, the equivalent of the southern cotton gin owners who so bedevilled Whitney was Lee De Forest, the inventor of the vacuum tube. De Forest insisted that he had hit upon the idea of the "feedback" circuit before Armstrong. The patent litigation over the "feedback" lasted for a generation, and in the meantime the patent itself ran out. Though he had already had seventeen years of royalty money out of the feedback circuit, plus Radio Corporation stock options which had made him independently wealthy, Armstrong allowed the disillusioning De Forest episode to color and set his own character for the remainder of his life.

The noteworthy thing about this is that De Forest was not a corporation man, but a free lance like Armstrong himself. In the subsequent fight which Armstrong waged against the Radio Corporation for justice to his FM inventions, a corporation was the nominal enemy. But other corporations—GE, Westinghouse, Zenith, Stromberg-Carlson—stood by Armstrong. So the enemy was not a "system," but the particular men who ran RCA.

Right here Mr. Lessing fails to isolate and stress a most important point: the corporation that was RCA could not have kept Armstrong from developing frequency modulation on his own if it had not had an inside track with the Federal Communications Commission. In other words, the "enemy" was not the men of the corporation as such, but the men of the corporation in alliance with—and in indirect control of—the co-

ercise mechanism of the State. The FCC controlled the allocations of wave lengths—and by denying FM its fair channels of communication in the public domain of the air the FCC effectively throttled Armstrong. So it was the political power that was Armstrong's real enemy.

Should Armstrong have paid the little men of the FCC the compliment of killing himself? Ideally, no. Commander McDonald of the Zenith Corporation hasn't committed suicide because the FCC stupidly refuses to license his pay-as-you-see television system, and he isn't likely to. But with Armstrong, his character was his fate.

If Mr. Lessing's case against the "corporations" is entirely too dogmatic, it does manage to establish one fact clearly. This fact is that every great product of modern industry may be traced to an independent individual. Modern radio is built on the

inventions of Marconi, Fessenden, Edison, De Forest, Armstrong and Langmuir—and only Langmuir had any connection with an industrial laboratory. Color photography was developed, as William Whyte says, by two musicians fooling around in a bathroom. The synthetic fibers and plastics were originated by university men in Germany and at Harvard. And independent European physicists did the groundwork for atomic energy. Corporations can apply basic discoveries, but they do not create the climate which brings them into being.

So there is a case against allowing the corporation to swallow up the independent mind. The unstressed point of Mr. Lessing's book, however, is that the swallowing can hardly take place without the connivance of the State. It is the political power which is the only enemy that can suppress the truly creative man.

Harper Prizewinner

Tower in the West, by Frank Norris.
362 pp. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$3.95

The heart of any tale—club car story or epic poem—is its teller. What happens, to whom, and why, are important of course; but what really holds our attention is "the glittering eye" of whatever Ancient Mariner speaks.

One reads the first hundred or so pages of Frank Norris' 1957 Harper Prize novel with delight because the narrator is engaging. Rambling back over his youth as the brother of a brilliant architect, he writes like a wryly personable columnist; and, in fact, his text is more like a series of discursive editorials on selected events than a novel. The tone is lightly acerbic, with lyric asides, so that, instead of conventional storytelling, we get passing reflections on the amenities of good hotel service, the charm of speakeasy New York, the planetary transmission of a Model T Ford, and the reader's own reactions to it all. (I was frequently reminded of the master of this method, Vladimir Nobokov.)

The story—if there may be said to be one—is a three-generation affair, sketching in the fortunes of several St. Louis families who own the stock

in a skyscraper called the Tower in the West. Built, in 1916, in a spirit of arrogant dash and imagination, it ends up, after World War Two, being lamely offered to the government as a university site. The owner does not feel charitable; he simply lacks the enterprise to do something with it himself. He wants the problem of his own limp initiative taken off his hands. Similarly, when he confronts the man who has seduced his wife, the narrator says: "A medieval man would have indignantly slapped his face . . . a Renaissance man would have laughed at him, but a man like myself . . . now felt only numbness and sorrow."

It is this rueful yet never desperate self-deprecation which gives the latter half of the book its lax, unsatisfying feel. There's a sense of loose ends, of everything petering out in merely perfunctory deaths, marriages and begettings. The closer the narrator comes to the present day, the less authoritative and effectual he sounds. He recognizes that ours is an age of timidity, smallness, and fear of initiative. But he seems to feel that all he should ever do about it is acknowledge it; uncomfortably, yes, but never urgently or passionately enough to risk saying anything fool-

ish, ungraceful, or unironic about it.

Of course, for exactly this reason many people will read *Tower in the West* with sympathy. Like Mr. Norris' hero, they will enjoy the contentment of an "honesty" which has cost them almost nothing; and like him, too, they will become a little less able ever to do anything about their mediocrity except safely and inexpensively deprecate it.

ROBERT PHELPS

Savagery

The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven. (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I.) 346 pp. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. \$5.00

The twelve essays collected in this volume vary greatly in cogency, but the net effect is profoundly disturbing.

B. F. Skinner demolishes the Freudian mythology by pointing out some of the obvious logical inconsistencies; but, alas, all this is for the profit of his own pet absurdity, Radical Behaviorism, which holds that men are bundles of tropisms and can be described only in terms of what they do. He is quoted in the following article as contending that the statement "a man eats *because* he is hungry" is "redundant" because "a single set of facts is described by the two statements: 'He eats' and 'He is hungry.'"

Radical Behaviorism is criticized by Scriven, who patiently demonstrates that (as any tramp knows) a man may have the impulse to eat without eating, and that (as any dinner guest knows) a man may eat without appetite.

Mr. R. C. Buck examines the theory of "General Behavior Systems" which is the current rage in sociology. He cites as a specimen an elaborate description of the growth of slime mold in a "less favorable" environment, which is said to provide "a remarkable model of how human beings band together under stress from a common enemy, as did the Londoners, for example, during the fire raids of World War II." Mr. Buck patiently points out that Englishmen and slime mold are biologically distinguishable organisms, and proves that they do

not, for example, reproduce in the same way.

When one considers the kind of nonsense that it is now deemed necessary solemnly to refute, one begins to fear that the next time he visits a university campus he may find the "social scientists" with feathers in their hair and faces painted blue dancing in a circle. They will, of course, be making rain.

REVILO OLIVER

Economics: A Science?

The Role of the Economist as Official Adviser, by W. A. Johr and H. W. Singer. With a foreword by Professor E. A. G. Robinson, C.M.G., O.B.E. London: George Allen and Unwin, 10s. 6d.

It is the major thesis and burden of this book that the principal task of economics is to provide advice to governments. This function is contrasted with what the authors call pure or basic research—on the whole to the detriment of the latter unless directly relevant to issues of policy.

This presentation of the case (which is in line with the most influential contemporary thinking on the subject) overlooks and obscures essential distinctions. The basic aim and task of economics is similar to that of other sciences, namely, the discernment of uniformities of behavior underlying the diversity of conditions; that is, the establishment of successful generalizations about the phenomena with which it deals. The success of this makes possible the statement of cause and effect, or

functional relationships, and the correct prediction of the likely results of particular courses of action.

It is by such propositions that the economist can assist the policy-maker. Policy decisions and direct policy recommendations must always be based on an assessment of the total situation, which has many facets of which the economic is only one. Moreover, measures and recommendations of policy must be largely influenced by value judgments, especially by one's views about the kind of society one prefers. If the economist is preoccupied with direct policy recommendations, his propositions and conclusions will be much influenced by various considerations which, although essentially relevant to the framing of policy, lie outside his own technical competence. He thereby arrogates to himself the functions of the politician or civil servant.

The policy-maker will then not know whether the economist has already incorporated the necessary compromise into his analysis, or whether his conclusions reflect the results of purely technical analysis. Such a course also often serves as an excuse or cloak for technical incompetence and generally muddled thinking. The most effective and honest way in which the economist can contribute to policy is to argue rigorously within his proper sphere; and, while stating the basis of his argument clearly, to pursue it ruthlessly to its conclusion, on the clear understanding that there are many other factors besides the economic.

There are passages in the book, especially in chapter 7, which reflect some awareness of this issue, but the general tenor is very different. This explains, for instance, the insistence on such faculties as the *coup d'oeil* (quick grasp of the general situation), or on the readiness to listen to delegates to international organizations because

economists will be able to learn from the debates what propositions or lines of approach are likely to command more general acceptance, and hence stand a better chance of leading to action. Further . . . the economist working for an international organization ought to achieve some degree of emotional identification [my emphasis] with the purpose of the organization as set out in its charter.

PETER BAUER

A Record to Study

The Magsaysay Story, by Carlos P. Romulo and Marvin M. Gray. 316 pp. New York: The John Day Company. \$5.00

This is the heartening story of the white-hatted, silver-mounted "good guy's" triumphant fight against the unshaven, dark-mounted "bad guys." "Good guy" Ramon Magsaysay, the self-educated blacksmith's son, not only decimates the Communist Huks, but also foils those "bad guys" of the Right, the corrupt Philippine politicians whose selfish shenanigans gave the Huks their opening.

Carlos P. Romulo needs no introduction here. Marvin M. Gray is an American who knows the Philippines as a former newspaper publisher in Manila. And although their account may be touched with hero worship, it is based on intimate knowledge of the man. It may well be a revelation to most readers how near the Communists came to taking over the Philippines around 1950. Magsaysay, first as Secretary of Defense and then as President, wiped out the threat in a way perhaps unequaled by anti-Communist leaders anywhere. His operations and methods should be studied throughout the free world.

Throughout the Japanese occupation Magsaysay was one of the key commanders of the Philippine guerrilla forces. During MacArthur's invasion of the Philippines an amphibious task force closed down near the coast of Zambales Province of north-west Luzon, Magsaysay's birthplace, in a maneuver to outflank Subic Bay. Before the battleships and cruisers could begin to shell the coastal defenses word flashed among the ships that the guerrillas had sent out canoes to call off the barrage because the Japanese had pulled out. We in the fleet did not know then that Magsaysay, as commander of the Zambales resistance, had cleared the area: our soldiers were greeted on the beaches by Filipinas bearing armloads of flowers.

With such a record, Magsaysay sits virtually unnoticed in Malacanang Place in Manila—while Tito awaits his state visit to Washington, as guest of the General who rode to power on a "liberation" platform.

MONTGOMERY M. GREEN

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To the Editor

Not a Spokesman

A recent letter in your columns from John V. Watson purports to speak for several hundred members of the Christian Science Church. We wish to draw to your attention that Mr. Watson does not speak for the Christian Science Church itself nor for the overwhelming majority of Christian Scientists who give loyal support to their daily newspaper, the *Christian Science Monitor*. The *Monitor's* support of a free press, free government, and free enterprise is too well known to need any defense.

Boston, Mass.

WILL B. DAVIS

Manager, Committees on Publication
The First Church of Christ, Scientist

Conservatives in College

Since my "discovery" of your magazine two months ago, I have read every issue and almost every piece of writing in those issues. For a person like myself, who is surrounded by "progressive" pseudo-intellectuals at college, your publication is a boon and a joy. . . . You have given me confidence and optimism. I think I can argue the conservative plea more effectively now.

New York City

RICHARD PIRRELO

As an active member of the College of William and Mary debate team, I have found the magazine an invaluable assistance in the formulation of a positive approach to present world problems.

Williamsburg, Va.

M. ROY COHEN

Interpreting Mr. Kennan

Without attempting to reply in detail to the article "The Liberal Against Himself" [December 22], I feel that one obvious misinterpretation of George Kennan's position should be corrected. It flows from two material omissions, each covered by three dots in the quotation from Mr. Kennan following the fourth paragraph.

Restoring the omissions, what Mr. Kennan actually said is this:

No one in this country has deeper sympathy than myself with those moderate and democratically minded people—many of them my good friends—who have been driven into

exile by the sickening intolerance of these communist regimes. But *there is a finality, for better or for worse, about what has now occurred in eastern Europe*; and it is no service to these people to encourage them to believe that they could return and pick up again where they left off ten or twenty years ago.

From this it should be clear what was final in Mr. Kennan's view was the alienation of the democratically minded exiles from whatever governments might arise in the future in the satellite states.

And that he was not using the term "finality" in the sense in which it is interpreted in Mr. Evans' article becomes abundantly clear from the very next sentences which follow the paragraph quoted:

Whether we like it or not, the gradual evolution of these communist regimes to a position of greater independence and greater responsiveness to domestic opinion is the best we can hope for as the next phase of development in that area. It is through this process that the respective peoples will best be able to return to something resembling a normal and independent participation in world affairs.

New York City

FRANK ALTSCHUL

Mr. Evans Replies

Mr. Altschul's protest is, I think, easily disposed of. To take the second of the alleged "omissions" first: Mr. Kennan's allusion to "gradual evolution," which Mr. Altschul thinks inimical to my argument, was included in the quotation as I gave it (the second sentence of the allusion, quoted by Mr. Altschul and omitted by me, begins, in the Kennan speech, a new train of thought). Mr. Altschul's mere citation of it does not, therefore, make anything "abundantly clear."

Mr. Altschul also objects to my striking those portions of the Kennan quotation that connect it with "democratically minded exiles." Inclusion of these references would have unnecessarily created a problem of preparing the reader to understand the specific context of Mr. Kennan's remarks. . . . Omitted or included, however, these words do not alter the opinion that Mr. Kennan expresses.

The key sentence of the Altschul

letter states that it is "clear what was final in Mr. Kennan's view was the alienation of the democratically minded exiles from whatever governments might arise in the future in the satellite states." This paraphrase represents no appreciable change in meaning from the quotation as it appeared in my article. If, in Mr. Kennan's view, the "democratically minded exiles" will be alienated from whatever governments obtain in the satellites, then it is "clear" that those governments will not be the result of "fundamental forces" of unrest discerned by George Kennan in the November 24, 1956, issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*. Kennan of last May is still pitted against Kennan of last November. Which is precisely the point I was attempting to make. . . .

Although Mr. Altschul does not in fact point out any "material omission" in my article, there was one such that should be mentioned. Owing to an unfortunate typographer's elision, page 13, column three, my article represented Kennan as saying that America "should accede in the entry of Communist China into neutral zones, etc." What I actually wrote, and what Kennan actually recommended, was that America "should a) accede in the entry of Communist China into the United Nations; b) turn Germany and Japan into neutral zones, etc."

Washington, D.C.

M. STANTON EVANS

LIBERATION: WHAT NEXT?

(Continued from p. 62)

To advocate a policy expressed in terms like "neutralization," "mutual withdrawal" and "negotiation" conjures shades of appeasement. For anti-Communists it is more congenial to sit undisturbed inside the familiar tough rhetoric that curtained their sector of the 1949-56 stabilization.

What actually are the alternatives? None has been openly offered from any source, official or unofficial, in the non-Communist world, which today has no policy at all, other than an outmoded carryover from the past. In practice the real alternatives are: from the soft non-Communists, passive coexistence plus Titoism and foreign aid; from the hard anti-Communists, denunciation mingled with a vague and rather empty intransigence. Neither is good enough.